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HOW THE CORPORATION CONQUERED
JOHN BULL
A. W. Brian Simpson*

INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1720-1844. By Ron Harris. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 2000. Pp. xvi, 331. Cloth, $ 60.
This is a study of the evolution of the forms of business organiza
tion during the industrial revolution. Historians never fully agree
about anything at all, and often with good reason, but there is really
no doubt that the period covered by this book is one that saw major
changes in agricultural and industrial production, and in commercial
practice and organization. It is convenient to refer broadly to the
changes which took place in terms of a revolution, industrial, agricul
tural, or less commonly, commercial in nature.
Long before the starting date for this study, which is the date of the
Bubble Act of

1720,

there had existed firms of one kind or another,

which had engaged in production, commerce, and consumption. The
oldest form taken by the firm is the family. There existed in medieval
and early modern England numerous other important legally recog
nized associations or collectivities, such as households, guilds, colleges,
universities, Inns of Court and Inns of Chancery, convents, cities, bor
oughs and charitable foundations, such as hospitals. The typical form
of association employed for business purposes was the partnership.
But in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the insti
tution of the corporation, which was conceived to possess a personality
distinct from that of its members, and which had evolved outside the
commercial world, came to be employed for business purposes.
In the same period the Court of Chancery invented the conception
of the trust, an institution to some degree modeled on the earlier me
dieval institution of the use. In origin quite unconnected with the
commercial world, the trust could, potentially, be adapted for use in
the commercial field, though this development was not to take place
until the eighteenth century.
The main emphasis of Ron Harris's Industrializing English Law:
Entrepreneurship and Business Organization 1720-18441 is on the
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forms of commercial group organization, some incorporated, some
not, which were available to the business community after 1720, in
particular during the industrial revolution. Harris provides a full chap
ter devoted to the pre-1720 business corporation, which was mainly
associated with overseas trade and monopoly. Two distinct forms of
business corporation evolved - the regulated corporation and the
joint stock corporation. In the case of the regulated corporation, un
like the joint stock corporation, members of the company traded with
their individual stock, and the company provided the infrastructure
necessary to make the venture successful. It was possible for incorpo
ration to depend upon prescription, but business corporations mainly
came into existence by way of grant or concession from the state, op
erating either through a Crown charter or the issue of letters patent
under the prerogative, or through an Act of Parliament to which the
Crown assented. There existed no right to incorporation; incorpora
tion came about as a consequence of negotiations between entrepre
neurs and the Crown, and was a privilege. Most business activity was
conducted by individual entrepreneurs or by entrepreneurs operating
in partnership, not through business corporations.
At the end of the day, the winner was, of course, the joint stock
corporation with limited liability. It supplanted the partnership as the
typical form of business organization, differing from the partnership,
in earlier times the dominant form, by possessing independent legal
personality, transferable assets, limited liability, and an internal hier
archical management structure. Associated with the rise of the joint
stock corporation was the evolution of organized markets in which
stock could be traded, along with government bonds. A school of
thought attributes the triumph of such corporations over the partner
ship to their superior efficiency. As Harris points out (p. 22 n.19), this
conception of efficiency is somewhat differently analyzed by lawyers,
by economists, and by law and economics scholars, but all those who
rely on the concept of efficiency as the basic tool of explanation pres
ent the modern corporate form as being "of phenomenal importance
for the rise of modern industrial capitalism" (p. 23). It is thought to
possess as dramatic an importance in Western history as "the discov
ery of America or the invention of the steam engine" (p. 23). So if you
want to know how the West grew rich, and think it has something to
do with the institutions of the law, study the invention of the modern
corporate form of business organization.
Those devoted to universalizing the explanatory power of effi
ciency tend to present the historical process as driven by a sort of in
evitability; other forms of business organization, which lose out in the
process, resemble giraffes with medium-length necks, doomed, if they
ever existed at all, not to make even cameo appearances on the
Discovery Channel or amongst the wildebeest on the Serengeti Plains.
Harris is an economic historian, and historians are by disposition un-
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easy with historical inevitability. He also sets out to give an account of
triumph of the joint stock corporation by combining insights derived
from general historical writings, from the writings of economists and
economic historians, and from legal historians. He has no inclination
to write winners' history, but rather to explain a complicated process
of evolution over time. He suspects that a belief in the driving force of
efficiency, which for some odd reason triumphs only in the nineteenth
century, though presumably it was around since the beginnings of
time, does little by itself to illuminate a complicated story. At the same
time he has no wish to neglect the importance of the concept, and is by
no means uninterested, as many historians have been, in general theo
retical explanations of historical change.
So his book opens with a valuable analysis of the literature that
addresses the relationship, if there is one, between legal and economic
development. Harris argues that, in the main, this literature adopts, to
a greater or less degree, one of two contrasting paradigms or, in Max
Weber's terms, relates explanation to two contrasting ideal types. Ac
cording to one paradigm, the law and the legal system are viewed as
relatively autonomous. Legal change, when it occurs, is managed by an
elite group of professional lawyers, and in particular by the tiny cote
rie of judges. It is driven by the internal logic of the law, and is rela
tively unaffected by economic and social forces external to the law. An
example of a body of law which, at least in its detailed ramifications,
might seem obviously to fit this paradigm would be the bizarre "Rule
in Shelley's Case."2 According to this paradigm:

[T]he Bubble Act, the common law, and legal hostility to the share mar
ket played significant parts in hindering the development of the joint
stock company for more than a century. After the passage of the Bubble
Act, unincorporated joint stock companies were declared illegal by
judges and their formation was harshly punished. Incorporation by the
State was an expensive and complicated matter, granted only in excep
tional cases. The legal framework was unresponsive to economic needs
and delayed the progress of joint stock companies in England until well
into the nineteenth century. (p.4; footnotes omitted)
The ramifications of conceiving of the law in this way are various: for
example, the legal elite is portrayed as isolated from commercial soci
ety, and ill-informed as to its needs and of the practice of the business
community. Economic development is presented as coming about in
spite of the law, or even, on occasions, outside the law entirely. There
are indeed familiar examples of business practices that have evolved

2. Though, as I have argued elsewhere, that is only part of the story. See A.W.B.
SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13-44 (1995) [hereinafter LEADING
CASES IN THE COMMON LAW].
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outside the common law; an example would be the early futures mar
kets.3
According to an opposing paradigm, the law and the legal system
are not viewed as autonomous, but rather as being reactive to external
pressures and needs. When legal evolution was required by the busi
ness community, it swiftly occurred: "The law responded functionally
to the economy and placed no restraints on growth during the indus
trial revolution" (pp.

5-6).

The law, according to this view, is not autonomous, but rather
functional. The basic plausibility in this approach is obvious enough.
After all, it was in England that the industrial revolution took place;
by the mid-nineteenth century Britain had become the workshop of
the world, and the first modern superpower. If an autonomous legal
system, as postulated by the first paradigm, operated as a drag on de
velopment, how could such dramatic development have ever oc
curred?
A third possibility that Harris mentions but does not develop much
at a theoretical level involves a compromise position (p. 7). According
to this, the formal law is presented as indeed being autonomous, but
the business community and their lawyers manipulated it, or even by
passed it entirely, so as to serve their needs. Law, according to this
paradigm, is at the same time both autonomous and functional, but
functional only because it is infinitely malleable. More radically, it
could even be argued that according to this paradigm the forms of law,
or at least of large areas of law, are simply irrelevant to economic de
velopment. Whatever the state of the law, the needs of the business
community, or any other powerful social group, will be served. This
way of looking at the matter is not unlike the claim, advanced by some
writers wedded to the conception of economic efficiency, that efficient
legal rules and institutions will drive out inefficient ones. The differ
ence is that the claim is not so much that rules and institutions will
change, but that they will be, in effect, distorted.
Harris's own position starts from the position that neither the
autonomous paradigm, nor the functional paradigm can, by itself, sat
isfactorily explain the developments in the law of business organiza
tion in his period. The empirical evidence is incompatible with an
analysis which fails to appreciate that law is both autonomous and
functional or, to put it another way, that the autonomous character of
law is in continuous tension with its functional character. So his aim is
"to demonstrate the advantages of abandoning the poles and moving
towards the center" (p. 8). Hence his interpretation "does not offer a
simple and coherent thesis, as this cannot be supported by the com
plex nature of the interaction" (pp. 8-9).

3. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Origins of Futures Trading in the Liverpool Cotton
Market, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 179 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 199 1).
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In addition, Harris emphasizes, as do most empirical historians, the
importance of "in economists' jargon path dependency, exogenous
shocks, and contingency. Many historians have, in fact, been aware of
such factors for quite a while, though without theorizing about them
or giving them fancy labels" (p. 11). A book whose starting point is the
Bubble Act of 1720 is bound to pay attention to exogenous shocks, for
the passage of this Act took place at the time of the collapse of the
share market known as the South Sea Bubble, and all serious histori
ans attach some significance to contingency and happenstance. The
conception of path dependency is employed throughout the study in
the contention that where legal institutions end up is often condi
tioned by the position from which they began, or, as the point is put in
one passage by "the historical burden" (p. 40). In reading Harris's in
troductory theoretical discussion I could not but be reminded of those
brief passages in which Oliver Wendell Holmes set out, in epigram
matic form, his limited but seminal ideas on the nature of law and le
gal development, ideas which he was, sadly, unable to either develop
or use himself. In his claim that the life of the law has not been logic,
but experience,4 he put his faith in the functional paradigm. But in the
following passage he argued that: "The substance of the law at any
given time pretty nearly corresponds, as far as it goes, with what it
then understood to be convenient; but its form, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depends very much upon
its past. "5
Harris, in his account of the evolution of business organization,
emphasizes the importance of a factor not to be found in Holmes,
which is the process which produces legal change. For a theme which
runs through this book is that the legal situation of groups of entre
preneurs was, in this period, the product of conflict and negotiation
between rival interest groups, mediated through a political process
rather than a process of adjudication. In a sense, therefore, what is in
volved in this study is not so much the relationship between law and
legal change and economic development, but between the political
process and legal development.
In order to make his account of the developments after 1720 intel
ligible, Harris gives a brief account of group organizations as they ex
isted in the late medieval and early modern period. In the sixteenth
century, the corporation, which was not originally associated with the
world of commerce, was adapted for commercial use, and Harris pro
vides a full chapter devoted to the pre-1720 business corporation,
which was mainly associated with the establishment of monopolies de
voted to overseas trade. Incorporation could come about only through
4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 ( Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Har
vard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).

5. Id. at 6.
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a Royal grant under the prerogative powers of the Crown, or through
a legislative ad hoc Act of Parliament; there was no general legislation
permitting groups of entrepreneurs to achieve incorporation so long as
they satisfied conditions specified by general law and went through
some formal process of registration. By the early eighteenth century,
there existed a relatively small number of joint stock business corpora
tions, such as the Hudson Bay Company, the South Sea Company, and
the Bank of England, which had been formally incorporated. There
had also evolved an active share market, dealing in the stock both of
incorporated business companies, and of companies that had not been
formally incorporated. A scheme was promoted whereby the South
Sea Company was to take over the national debt, with government
bonds converted into stock in the South Sea Company. The scheme
ended in disaster with a catastrophic collapse of the market. The
Bubble Act of

1720

made it a criminal offence for any undertaking to

purport to act as a corporate body in raising or transferring stock un
less it had been authorized by Royal Charter or Act of Parliament,6
and was at one time generally explained as a reaction to the collapse
of the South Sea Bubble. Harris, however, thinks this is incorrect. The
Bubble Act was, in fact, promoted by the South Sea Company itself
before the crash. But the context in which the Act was passed associ
ated it with a suspicious and hostile attitude to operations by unincor
porated companies, whose promotion was associated with fraud and
the encouragement of wild and hazardous schemes, an attitude that
long persisted, and that was combined with hostility to those who dealt
in shares of such companies. But for a long time, the provisions in the
Act which adopted a punitive attitude to unincorporated joint stock
companies with transferable stock were a dead letter, and the criminal
provision in the Act was only once invoked in this period.
In the period following the Bubble Act there was an important
change in practice. The Crown adopted a restrictive policy toward the
grant of new charters of incorporation. This left entrepreneurs with
two alternative strategies. One was to employ forms of business asso
ciation that did not involved incorporation. The other was to promote
Acts of Parliament, known as Local and Personal Acts, under which
they could enjoy the advantages of incorporation. This mechanism for
incorporation depended for its validity upon the sovereign powers of
Parliament, which could enact not only general legislation, but also
particular legislation relating to a single person, as in the case of di
vorce Acts, or relating to a particular scheme of industrial or agricul
tural development.
So far as the first possibility is concerned, Harris gives a detailed
account of the forms of unincorporated association which were on of-

6. The Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo., c. 18 (Eng.).
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fer: in addition to family ownership and partnerships there were possi
bilities in the trust, employed in schemes of road improvement, for ex
ample, in the turnpike trusts, and outside the world of the common
law there existed the system of ship ownership under the Court of
Admiralty, and the system of cost book accounting operated by min
ing companies governed by the stannary law of the hard rock mining
world, which was predominantly located in Cornwall. Given some in
genuity, entrepreneurs could operate as unincorporated companies,
relying upon schemes that made use of normal contract law, of part
nership law, and the trust.
In Part II of his book, Harris explores the relationship between
economic and commercial development in particular fields and the
forms of organization employed. Why was it that in the eighteenth
century, after the invention of the joint stock corporation, forms of
unincorporated business organization continued to be employed in
some sectors of the economy, for example in insurance and in highway
improvement, but not in others, such as in some other sectors of the
transport industry, in particular the building of canals and the im
provement of navigable rivers? Why the divergence? Why indeed did
it take so long for the joint stock corporation, once invented, to
achieve a dominant position? Was it that it was not in reality of supe
rior efficiency? Or was it that the conditions in which it did possess su
perior efficiency simply did not exist in the eighteenth century? Or
was it that there existed costs or other entry barriers associated with
incorporation which were sufficiently serious to persuade entrepre
neurs that it was preferable for them to operate through unincorpo
rated forms?
Harris argues that the joint stock corporation as a form of organi
zation had significant advantages over unincorporated forms, and that,
at least in some sectors of the economy, the conditions in which it was
superior existed in the period under consideration. But with the de
clining use of the Royal prerogative power to grant corporate status by
charter, entrepreneurs had to rely upon private Acts of Parliament
and this had the consequence of subjecting incorporation to political
control. It was not the costs of promoting an Act that served as the
impediment, for these were relatively modest, but rather the fact that
the procedures involved gave an opportunity for rival interest groups
to combine in an attempt to block the scheme. Thus, for example, ex
isting insurance corporations, operating within a nationwide market,
had an incentive to prevent a new group of entrepreneurs joining the
club by securing a private act, and were able, by exploiting the politi
cal character of the parliamentary procedures, to make it extremely
difficult for such an act to be obtained. But since no nationwide corpo
ration engaging in river improvement existed, a group of entrepre
neurs who promoted a new scheme for a particular river was not likely
to encounter the same sort of opposition from vested interests. This
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explains the divergence between the forms of organization typically
used in these two sectors of the economy. There were numerous pri
vate acts for river improvement, but few in the world of insurance.
Harris does not rely solely on this explanation for divergences in
the use of the corporate form. There were other explanatory factors
involved; where production was organized in relatively small units op
erating in particular localities, the continuous interrelation between
actors might encourage personal trust, thus making the advantages of
the corporate form less important. In the course of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, Parliament did not establish any clearly
settled or general principles to guide itself in granting or refusing to
grant incorporation by private act: "[N]o clear policy or general crite
ria existed for incorporation during much of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century [sic]. Incorporation was granted or refused on the
basis of the level of opposition of conflicting vested interests" (p.

136).

But if there was no body of settled criteria, there were trends, and
there was an important development, which was the outcome of politi
cal processes rather than of autonomous legal evolution. This was the
progressive curtailment of the association between incorporation and
monopoly - a target for the political economists. By

1833,

when the

Bank of England's monopoly in the issuing of notes was curtailed, this
association had largely disappeared, so that a characteristic generally
shared by approved schemes of incorporation was that they were not
schemes involving the grant of legal monopoly powers. The joint stock
corporation had become a mechanism for facilitating competition in a
free market; in origin it had been a mechanism for the establishment
of trading monopolies. Its economic function had been transformed.
Harris's general explanation is convincingly argued, but gives rise
to a puzzle - why did the use of incorporation by charter under the
prerogative decline in the eighteenth century? The process is an aspect
of the steady rise in the conventional power of Parliament at the ex
pense of the Crown, and the explanation for this essentially constitu
tional development largely lies outside the scope of this book. From a
positive point of view, Harris's analysis of the evidence is part of a lit
erature that emphasizes the central importance of the private bill as an
instrument of economic development during the agricultural and in
dustrial revolution.7 There is a considerable body of writing on the his
tory and functioning of private bill procedure; we still lack a general
study.
In the early nineteenth century, the Bubble Act, whose somewhat
obscure provisions had long lain dormant, was revived, and by now it
was the received wisdom that the Bubble Act had been a reaction to

7. See LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 2 18-20. Important recent
books of relevance are J. GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
( 2000) , and R. w. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825-1875 (1994).
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the ill deeds of promoters of fraudulent schemes, operating unlawfully
perhaps even at common law. So the legality of unincorporated busi
ness companies became an issue in the courts. Harris attributes this
revival to the rapid expansion in the number of unincorporated com
panies promoted in the late eighteenth century, and to the lack of sta
bility in the market for shares that characterized the period. It became
clear that the provisions of the Bubble Act were alive and well, and
that at least some unincorporated companies were illegal. There was a
speculative boom from 1824-1825, and in 1825 the Court of King's
Bench held, in the case of Josephs v. Peber,8 that the Equitable Loan
Bank Company, which had opened its books for the sale of shares
without waiting for incorporation under a private act, was illegal, so
that a contract for the purchase of its shares was void. In Kinder v.
Taylor,9 (also 1825) the Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, expressed the
view that the unincorporated Del Monte Company might well be ille
gal not only under the Bubble Act, but also at common law. During
this period, the judges and the legal system they controlled swam
against the commercial tide in the name of paternalism. The law, pre
sented as an autonomous body of doctrine protective both of the royal
prerogative and the unwary investor, appeared unresponsive to well
established business practice and to economic and commercial needs.
Parliament responded by repealing the Bubble Act in 1825. The mem
ber of Parliament who introduced the first Bill for the repeal of the
Act, Peter Moore, stated in the Commons:

At present the law in respect to these companies was very obscure and
ill-understood ....The necessity of settling a question of so much impor
tance was placed beyond question, by the amount of capital which was
daily investing in these speculations, and which [it] would be safe in esti
mating at upwards of 160 millions.01
Moore, as Harris shows, was himself much involved as an entrepre
neur in the speculations of the period, and had a vested interest in the
repeal of the Act, which was in any event brought about by a Bill
promoted by the Attorney General John Copley11 on behalf of the
government of the day. Copley thought that the correct strategy was
to relieve Parliament of the burden of controlling grants of incorpora
tion through private bill procedure, and to revive the practice of rely
ing on Crown Charters. Applications for charters would be monitored,
under the supervision of the Law Officers. Under such a system incor
poration retained the character of a privilege; entrepreneurs were not
to enjoy a right to incorporation.

8. 3 B. & C. 639 ( 1825).
9. L.J. O.S. Vol. III, Cases in Chancery68.
10.
1279).

P.

262 (citations omitted) (quoting 12

1 1. Later Lord Lyndhurst.
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One of the characteristics of the modern joint stock corporation is
the enjoyment of limited liability. In the case of partnerships, the lim
ited partnership was only accepted in 1907;12 the common law, unlike
the legal systems of continental Europe did not recognize such an in
stitution. There were, however, ways of providing for sleeping part
ners - one being to conceptualize them as lenders to the active part
ners, entitled to a share in the profits only in the form of interest on
the loan, which might generate problems over the usury laws that lim
ited interest rates. Another was to keep their identity a secret except
to the active partners (pp. 29-31). The result was that the limited part
nership did not play a significant role in business, though in the nature
of things it may be difficult to know how much of a role it did play.
The history of the association between incorporation and limited li
ability is both obscure and controversial, and Harris argues that the
partial explanation for this "lies in the confused and inconsistent defi
nition of limited liability by both contemporaries and historians"
(p. 128).
Three different kinds of debt might be involved - debts of share
holders to the corporation, those of shareholders to third parties, and
those of the corporation to third parties - and a number of different
issues could arise and be separately answered. For example:

Could shareholders, as such, be arrested for debts ...and could they, al
ternatively or in addition, be liable to bankruptcy laws as far as debts
were concerned? ... Were shareholders liable for corporate debt only
upon dissolution, or as soon as the unpaid debts were claimed? ...Were
shareholders liable only up to the sum of their paid-up capital? Could
calls also be made for the unpaid balance of the shares they held in order
to cover debts? (pp. 128-29)
In the course of the eighteenth century some of these issues were an
swered, so that for example ownership of shares in a business corpora
tion did not turn a shareholder into a trader liable to bankruptcy pro
ceedings. Occasionally, some aspect of limited liability was attached to
a corporation under the terms of a private act, though Harris is not
able to say how common this was. No doubt the matter deserves fur
ther investigation. But the general impression conveyed by the sources
is that limitation of liability may not have seemed so important to
early eighteenth century entrepreneurs as one might expect. One fac
tor that operates today - the fear of extensive liability in tort law hardly operated at all in this period. By the end of the eighteenth cen
tury, however, entrepreneurs, whether seeking incorporation by Royal
charter or by Act of Parliament, regarded limited liability in one form
or another as essential to success (p. 130). Harris does not really ex
plain why this change came about, though he does note the cruel char-

12. By The Limited Partnership Act.
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acter of contemporary law relating to debtors and bankrupts. By the
early nineteenth century it came to be settled that limited liability at
tached automatically to corporations created by Royal charter, and it
became common where incorporation was by private act to include a
clause providing for it, though again Harris does not provide much in
the way of detail as to the form of such clauses or their frequency. The
whole subject needs further investigation, both to establish a narrative
and to examine the significance of limited liability for economic de
velopment, since it seems that its recognition was not a prerequisite to
the industrial revolution.
At the end of the period covered by this book, Parliamentary con
trol over incorporation through private bill procedure was to be sup
planted by the system of registration. Under this system, Parliament
laid down the conditions under which any group of entrepreneurs
could establish a business corporation not by negotiation with the
Crown, and not through an essentially political process through pri
vate bill procedure, but by registration. Through registration they be
came subject to a scheme of regulation intended to provide members
of the public with information which, it was supposed, would enable
them to distinguish reliable companies from unreliable ones. In the
concluding chapter of his book, Harris traces the steps by which this
new approach to company formation came to be embodied in the
Companies Act of 1844. It can be seen as part of a wider development,
whereby a system under which the Parliamentary process was used to
authorize

or

refuse

authorization

to

particular

entrepreneurial

schemes, whether they were schemes for enclosures, for building
docks, for constructing canals, or whatever, through a form of conflict
resolution - each scheme being handled in isolation, was replaced by
a system where Parliament settled on some general scheme of regula
tion that all entrepreneurs had access to and could be changed by sub
sequent general legislation based on experience. This change was part
of a process that significantly altered the function of Parliament from a
body primarily concerned with privately promoted legislation to one
concerned with general legislation promoted by political parties.
Harris's study of the history of the forms of business association is
an important one, written by an author with a mastery of a large body
of literature, and always related to empirical evidence though con
tinuously informed by a concern with theoretical issues. It is clearly
written, and it is something of an achievement to have covered so wide
a subject in a book of modest length. Like all good books it does not
impose closure, but raises and suggests further lines of enquiry. It is a
fine book that deserves a wide readership.

